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1 Introduction
In most European economies, around 20 percent of all workers are employed by the govern-
ment. Government hire workers to produce goods and services. However, governments face
different constraints than private-sector firms and are not driven by profit maximization.
Hence, government employment and wage policies are driven by other objectives includ-
ing: attaining budgetary targets (Poterba and Rueben, 1998; Gyourko and Tracy, 1989);
implementing macroeconomic stabilization policy (Keynes, 1936; Holm-Hadulla et al., 2010;
Lamo et al., 2013); redistributing resources (Alesina et al., 2000; Alesina et al., 1999; Wilson,
1982); or satisfying interest groups for electoral gains (Borjas, 1984; Matschke, 2003; Gelb
et al., 2000). As a consequence, public-sector labour markets might behave differently from
their private-sector counterparts.
The objective of this paper is to establish a number of key facts about the French, Spanish,
UK and US labour market flows, focussing on the role played by the public sector. We do
so by examining data from the French, Spanish and UK Labour Force Surveys and the US
Current Population Survey (CPS) over the past 15 years. We chose these four countries
because they are large countries with sizable public sectors, and have been recently facing
pressure to reform their public sectors. Furthermore, because they have different labour
market institutions, public-sector hiring procedures and wage policies and various weights
on different industries, facts that are found to be common across the four countries should
be seen as intrinsic characteristics of the public sector. While we do not attempt to explain
these facts, we believe that they are an important first step to foster theoretical research on
the topic. They can help economists understand the characteristics of the public sector and
its policies, as well as provide a guideline of the empirical features that models with a public
sector should reproduce and help in the calibration or identification of key parameters. We
show that public-sector labour markets do indeed behave differently than the private sector.
The size of transition rates into and out of public-sector employment are different and its
cyclical pattern as well. Furthermore, the government hires mostly women, college graduates
and older workers, which creates asymmetric exposures to public-sector policies for different
workers.
In the last decade in European countries, public-sector employment was a key policy
variable. Following budgetary constraints, many countries imposed measures such as hiring
freezes layoffs of public-sector workers, as well as wage cuts or freezes that affected the
retention of these workers (Glasser and Watt, 2010). Given the policy role that public-
sector employment played during the last decade, a new wave of research constructs search
2
and matching models of unemployment to study the labour market effects of public-sector
employment and wages. Examples include Ho¨rner et al. (2007), Quadrini and Trigari (2007),
Afonso and Gomes (2014), Gomes (2015a, 2017), Michaillat (2014), Burdett (2012), Bradley
et al. (2018), Albrecht et al. (2018), Bermperoglou et al. (2017) and Boeing-Reicher and
Caponi (2017). Lying at the heart of these state-of-the-art models are the worker gross flows
between private- and public-sector employment and non-employment.
However, the extensive literature that estimates and analyses worker gross flows has
systematic ignored the role of the public sector. This literature has focused mainly on
disentangling the relative importance of job-finding and job-separation rates in driving the
unemployment rate. The most cited papers on the topic – Blanchard and Diamond (1990),
Shimer (2012), Elsby et al. (2009) and Fujita and Ramey (2009) – study the US labour
market, proposing different decompositions or examining the role of the time-aggregation
bias. Also for the US, Borowczyk-Martins and Lale´ (2019) distinguish between full-time and
part-time employment, while Elsby et al. (2015) study the role of the participation margin.
Smith (2011) proposes an out-of-steady-state decomposition and analyses the UK labour
market. Gomes (2012) further analyses the UK labour market along other dimensions, such
as education or labour force attachment, while Fujita (2010) concentrates on on-the-job
search and job-to-job transition and Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) on the extent of worker
reallocation across occupations and industries and their cyclicality. In two comparisons of
the UK and the US, Razzu and Singleton (2016) study the fluctuations of unemployment
among men and women, while Gomes (2015b) examines the role of conditional transition
probabilities and how they depend on the frequency of the surveys. Other papers focussing
on the UK include Elsby et al. (2011) and Elsby and Smith (2010).
Several studies examine other European labour markets. Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2008) compare the relative importance of job-finding and job-separation rates across France,
the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States. Silva and Va´zquez-Grenno (2013) focus
on the role of flows in and out of permanent and temporary employment in Spain. Baussola
and Mussida (2014) study Italian gross flows, concentrating on unemployment gender gaps.
Charlot et al. (2018) split between employment in abstract, routine and manual occupations
in France and the US. Other works examining the French labour market include Hairault
et al. (2012) and Fontaine (2016). Hertweck and Sigrist (2015) study the German labour
market and Daouli et al. (2012) the Greek labour market during the crisis. Despite looking
at worker flows from different angles, all the papers in this exhaustive list have ignored the
duality between the private and the public sectors.
In Section 3, we provide evidence on the size and cyclicality of the flows between pub-
3
lic and private employment, unemployment and inactivity. France and the UK have larger
public sectors than either Spain or the US. Over the last business cycle, public-sector em-
ployment was pro-cyclical in France, countercyclical in the US, and acyclical in Spain and
the UK.
In Section 4, we quantify how government hiring and separations have contributed to
unemployment fluctuations. We show that ignoring these flows in unemployment decompo-
sitions can potentially bias the relative importance of job-finding and job-separation rates,
although in our sample, this bias turned out to be small. We find a relative split of 80-20
percent of the contribution of private- and public-sector employment to fluctuations in the
unemployment rate in UK, 85-15 in France and of 90-10 percent in Spain and the US. We
performed a counterfactual analysis and show that since 2008, if governments had kept the
same hirings and separations from the previous years, unemployment rate would have been
lower, by up to 1 percentage point, in the France and the UK, but it would have been higher
in the US and Spain. In our view, this finding reflects the different macroeconomic poli-
cies conducted by governments in response to the Great Recession, with a larger focus on
austerity policies by some European countries.
We document that jobs are safer in the public sector – aggregate job-separation rates are
lower. In Section 5, we further investigate this result by using a multinomial logit model
to estimate the differences in transition rates from employment to unemployment and in-
activity from the two sectors, conditional on observable characteristics. The argument that
public-sector jobs are safer is often used in policy discussions surrounding public-sector pay.
However, while there are several papers estimating the wage differentials across sectors, there
are no estimates of the value of the job-security.1 We use a simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation to find the percentage of their wage that private-sector workers would be willing to
forgo to have the same job-separation probability as in the public sector. In our preferred
scenario, risk-neutral workers would pay 0.5 to 1.6 percent of their wage for the same job
security, which can be seen as a lower bound for the insurance value of public-sector em-
ployment. Risk-averse workers without any savings mechanism would pay 1.0 to 2.9 percent
of their wage, which can be seen as an upper bound. The value of job safety in the public
sector is equivalent to between 0.4 to 0.7 percent of total government spending in France
and between 0.2 to 0.4 percent in the UK, Spain and the US.
1Using micro level data, several papers find that, on average, the public sector pays higher wages than
the private sector. Examples include: Katz and Krueger (1991) for the United States; Postel-Vinay and
Turon (2007) or Disney and Gosling (1998) for the United Kingdom; and Christofides and Michael (2013),
Castro, Salto, and Steiner (2013) and Giordano et al. (2011) for several European countries.
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2 Preliminary concepts
2.1 Labour market dynamics
In order to analyse labour market dynamics, we use some fundamental equations that de-
scribe the evolution of the stock of the employed in the private and public sectors (P and
G) and the stock of the unemployed U . The pool of the inactive is denoted by I. Adding
the four pools gives us the working-age population W , while the sum of employment and
unemployment corresponds to the labour force L. The unemployment rate is defined as
u = U
L
and the participation rate as p = L
W
.
Changes in private and public employment evolve according to the following equations:
∆Pt+1 = λ
GP
t Gt + λ
UP
t Ut + λ
IP
t It − (λPGt + λPUt + λPIt )Pt, (1)
∆Gt+1 = λ
PG
t Pt + λ
UG
t Ut + λ
IG
t It − (λGPt + λGUt + λGIt )Gt, (2)
where λij is the transition probability between the pools indicated by the superscript. Sim-
ilarly, for unemployment and inactivity:
∆Ut+1 = λ
PU
t Pt + λ
GU
t Gt + λ
IU
t It − (λUPt + λUGt + λUIt )Ut, (3)
∆It+1 = λ
PI
t Pt + λ
GI
t Gt + λ
UI
t Ut − (λIPt + λIGt + λIUt )It. (4)
The transition rate multiplied by the stock is equivalent to the total number of transitions.
For each stock, the terms with a positive sign reflect the inflows from the three remaining
pools, while the term with a negative sign corresponds to the outflows.
2.2 Data
The information about jobs sectors (public/private), individuals’ position in the labor mar-
ket, worker flows and associated transition rates are extracted from each country’s repre-
sentative labour market survey, from which official statistics are drawn: the French Labour
Force Survey (FLFS), the UK Labour Force Survey (UKLFS), Spanish Labour Force Survey
(SLFS) and the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
Since a redesign in 2003, the FLFS is conducted quarterly. The sample of the survey is
a rotating panel composed of six waves. In each quarter, one sixth of the sample is renewed:
the “oldest” wave leaves the sample, whereas a new wave enters. The survey provides a set of
information about individuals’ characteristics, such as their education, their labour market
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status (constructed according to the definitions of the International Labour Organization)
and their economic activity. The longitudinal structure of the FLFS allows us to match
observations belonging to two consecutive surveys. We compute individuals’ transitions and
aggregate them to calculate the gross worker flows and transition rates in each quarter. Due
to the structure of the database, at best, five sixths of the sample can be matched between two
consecutive surveys. Panel attrition and non-response that reduce the size of the longitudinal
sample, as well as sample fluctuations, may affect the estimation of labor market states (and
so worker flows). In order to solve these statistical problems, Shimer (2012) and Silva and
Va´zquez-Grenno (2013) drop missing observations and reweight measured transitions by the
missing-at-random method. We proceed differently: each longitudinal sample is reweighted
by a method similar to the one proposed by Lundstrom and Sarndal (1999). The purpose is
to equalize, according to some leading variables (labour market states in the first quarter; age
pyramid by gender; household type; and education level), the structure of the longitudinal
sample with the known population structure in period t. See Fontaine (2016) for details.2
The UKLFS is a quarterly survey of households living at private addresses in the United
Kingdom. The panel samples around 60,000 households for five successive quarters. The
sample is split into five waves. Every quarter, one wave of approximately 12,000 households
leaves the survey and a new wave enters. See Gomes (2012) for more details on the survey.
Although the quarterly survey effectively starts in 1993, our baseline sample is restricted to
the period between 2003:1 and 2018:4 to allow for a more straightforward comparison with
the French survey.3 The Office for National Statistics already provides the census population
longitudinal weights, which we use to construct the flows series.
Like its French counterpart, the SLFS is a quarterly representative survey in which the
sample is divided into six waves. The SLFS samples about 65,000 households, which is
equivalent to around 180,000 individuals. See Silva and Va´zquez-Grenno (2013) for more
details on the survey. Although the quarterly survey starts in 1999, for the main results we
restrict our sample to the period between 2005:1 and 2018:4. The reason is that, before 2005,
the Spanish Statistical Office implemented a significant methodological change regarding
both the questionnaire and the data collection. As a consequence, it is not possible to link
the time series of labour market transitions with the two different methodologies. As no
longitudinal weights are provided, we follow the same procedure as the French survey to
2As Lundstrom and Sarndal (1999) demonstrate, this procedure can reduce sample fluctuations and the
non-response bias and has been adopted by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
to correct non-response bias and sample fluctuations in the FLFS.
3Furthermore, the current ONS files exclude the April-Sept dataset for 2001 and the Autumn-Winter for
1996. The full sample is available in the dataset that accompanies the paper.
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recalculate them.
For comparison with the rest of the literature, we provide evidence for the US, based on
the CPS. The CPS surveys households for four consecutive months, omits them for eight
months and then interviews them again for another four months. See Shimer (2012) for a
description of the survey. In contrast to the European surveys, the CPS allows the researcher
to compute the transition probabilities in the labour market at a monthly frequency. We
extend the Shimer (2012) code, publicly available on his webpage. To avoid the breaks in the
survey that are recurrent until 1995, we start our sample in 1996, but for comparison with
the European countries, we report the results for the 2003-2018 period in the main text.
2.3 Definition of public jobs
In our view, the defining characteristic of the public-sector is that its goods or services are not
sold, but are provided directly to the population. It uses the power of taxation to finance the
production of public goods, rival or non-rival, and governmental services. There are two main
government decisions that affect its employment level. First, governments decide the scope
of the public sector – which goods and services they want to provide. Second, they decide
whether to supply them directly by hiring workers – in-house production – or by outsourcing
it to private sector firms. These decisions are usually the outcome of a political process and
vary drastically across countries. As a consequence, the extent of the operation of the public
sector in different industries varies. It is important to bear in mind that, in this paper,
we do not focus on particular industries, i.e. public adminstration, but the entire sphere of
public-sector employment, even if it involves different weights on particular industries. Given
this conceptual view, we exclude from our definition of public-sector employment, public
enterprises, or state-owned enterprises, that provide various private goods and services for
sale and usually operate on a commercial basis.
The distinction between public- and private-sector jobs is based on a self-reported vari-
able, which is in accordance with how official statistics are drawn. During the survey, the
interviewer asks the individual to classify his employer. In the UK, we include the follow-
ing categories in our definition of public-sector employment : i) Central Government, Civil
Service; ii) Local government or council (incl. police, fire services and local authority con-
trolled schools or colleges); iii) University or other grant-funded educational establishment;
iv) Health authority or NHS trust; and v) Armed forces. We exclude from our definition
every private organization, as well as: i) Public company; ii) Nationalised industry or state
corporation; iii) Charity, voluntary organisation or trust; and iv) other organisation. A sim-
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ilar definition is used for France.4 For Spain, the survey asks directly whether respondents
work for the public or the private sector. For the United States, the definition of public
sector is working for the government (federal, state or local government).5
The shortcoming of a such declarative variable is that it could be subject to misclassifica-
tion of the sector of work. Misreporting of the sector is not a serious problem in computing
the overall stock of public and private sector employment, but it might overstate the tran-
sitions from public to private sector (and vice versa). Given that, for the unemployment
decomposition in Section 4, we compute a time-aggregation bias correction; the overstating
of flows between the two sectors can introduce noise or bias in all transition rates. A similar
problem exists for the flows in between unemployment and inactivity and was addressed by
Elsby et al. (2015). To solve this problem, we check whether the transitions between the
sectors are spurious by controlling for the tenure of jobs. We validate a direct transition
between the two sectors only when the respondent states that he has been working for the
same employer for less than three months. Bradley et al. (2018) use a similar method.
Unfortunately, the CPS does not report the tenure on the job, so we cannot apply the same
adjustment for spurious transitions for the United States. We use a different approach similar
to Elsby et al. (2015). We calculate the three-period transitions and calculate and remove
the fraction of moves between one sector and the other that revert to the initial sector on the
following month (remove the P-G-P from P-G flows, and the G-P-G out of the G-P flows).
The percentage of flows between public and private sector that are consider spurious
varies across countries. In the US, France, the UK and Spain, 17, 32, 55 and 87 percent
of the flows, respectively are spurious. Although the number for the Spain looks high, one
should put it in perspective. The error is relatively large, partly because the number of
transitions is very small. If we measure them relative to total employment, this high number
in Spain could be explained if 0.6 percent of the employees make a mistake in reporting their
sector. Still, one should be cautious about the quality of the Spanish data.
4We include: i) E´tat; ii) Collectivite´s territoriales; iii) Hoˆpitaux publics; and iv) Se´curite´ sociale. We
exclude: i) Particulier; ii) Entreprise publique; and iii) Entreprise prive´e.
5Defining the sphere of the public sector is hard and we opted for a conservative definition. Both the
UK and the US surveys distinguish the “not-for-profit” private employment. This employment, which is
non-negligible – 6 percent in the US and 4 percent in the UK – is attached to the private sector despite
having different features. Publicly owned firm that represent 5.7, 2.6 and 0.9 percent of employment in the
France, UK and Spain is also attached to the private sector.
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3 Worker gross flows
3.1 Average gross flows
Figure 1 summarizes the average quarterly (monthly) worker flows over the 2003-2018 pe-
riod for the three European countries (United States). It reports the stocks of workers in
thousands (t) and as a percentage of the working-age population (p), as well as the number
of people that change status every quarter (month) as a percentage of the working-age pop-
ulation (p) and as a transition probability or hazard rate (h). We restrict our analysis to the
working-age population (16 to 64 years old). The public sector employs 17.0 percent of the
working-age population in the UK, 13.7 percent in France, 12.0 percent in the US and 7.8
percent in Spain. It represents 23, 21, 16 and 16 percent of total employment, respectively.
The main difference between the two sectors is their turnover. Labour turnover, between
employment and non-employment, is lower in the public sector. In each quarter in the UK
and France, flows in and out of private-sector employment represent around eight percent of
its stock, while for the public sector, they are around 4.5 percent of its stock. In the United
States, monthly turnover represents seven percent in the private sector and 4.6 percent in
the public. In Spain, the turnover is larger, with 15.4 percent in the private sector and 9.3
percent in the public sector.
Fewer people separate from the public sector. The probability of moving from employ-
ment to unemployment is more than two times higher if working in the private sector in
the four countries. It is almost three times in the UK, where the probability is 1.47 percent
in the private sector and only 0.52 in the public sector. In all countries, the probability of
moving from employment to inactivity is around 30 percent higher in the private relative to
the public sector. Fewer separations imply that there are fewer hires. In the three European
countries, while roughly 20 percent of the unemployed find a job in the private sector each
quarter, only two to three percent find one in the public sector. In the United States, each
month, 20.73 percent of the unemployed find a job in the private sector, while only 1.88
percent find a public-sector job.
When leaving public-sector jobs to non-employment, workers are more likely to withdraw
from the labor force. In France, 67 percent of outflows from the public sector (to non-
employment) are directed to non-participation. The corresponding statistic for the private
sector amounts to 51 percent. The finding is stronger in the UK and the US, where more
than 72 percent of public-sector separations are to inactivity, but weaker in Spain, at 52
percent. Likewise, returns to public jobs from non-participation are also more frequent.
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Figure 1: Average worker flows, 2003-2018
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(b) UK, quarterly flows
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(c) Spain, quarterly flows
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(d) US, monthly flows
Note: the worker stocks and flows are expressed as total number of people in thousands (t), as a percentage
of the working-age population (p) or as a hazard rate (h). Data extracted from the French, UK and Spanish
Labour Force Survey, and the CPS. ∗ For the US, flows between private and public employment were adjusted
with a different methodology.
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In France and the UK, more than 50 percent of new hires in the public sector come from
inactivity, whereas in the private sector, that number is less than 50 percent. In Section 5,
we use a multinomial logit model to reevaluate these differences in separation probabilities
between sectors, controlling for observable characteristics.
There are few direct transitions between employment in the two sectors. Each quarter
in the France and Spain, only 0.12 percent of private-sector workers switch sector without a
measured spell of unemployment. This represents less than 15 percent of all inflows into the
public sector. In the UK and US these flows seem more important. In each quarter, 31 and
38 percent of the new hires in the public sector come directly from private employment.6
Understanding the importance of the direct transitions across the two sectors has implications
for the theoretical literature on the effects of public-sector employment. While Bradley et al.
(2018) model the direct transitions across the two sectors, most of the literature – including
Gomes (2018) or Albrecht et al. (2018) – ignores these. We find that, although transitions
between the two sectors are not negligible, most of the inflow into public-sector employment
comes from non-employment. These results are also consistent with the view, described in
Chassamboulli and Gomes (2018), that Spain and French public sectors are more segmented,
requiring competitive entry exams, which is not the case for the majority of public-sector
jobs in the UK and US.
The industries having the highest share of public-sector employment vary by country.
In France and the UK (see table in Appendix I) public-sector employment represents 85-
90 percent of total employment in “Public administration and defence.” With around 75-
80 percent of public-sector employment, “Education” is the sector with the second-highest
fraction of public-sector employment. “Health and social work” has also a very high number
of public-sector workers, but they represent only 55 percent of the total workers in the
industry in the UK and 36 percent in France. Other industries where the public sector
is relevant include “Water supply, sewerage, waste”, “Arts, entertainment and recreation”
and ”Extraterritorial organizations”. In the SLFS, the industries “Public Administration,
education and health activities” are not disaggregated, but within this group, 73 percent
6For the US, we have calculated the job-finding rate to public and private sector conditional on previous
status. These rates, shown in Appendix V, support the conclusion that the choice of sector is persistent,
even after an unemployment spell. The unconditional job-finding rate in the public sector is only 1.8 percent,
but conditional of being in the public sector in the month preceding unemployment it is close to 30 percent.
Curiously, the job-finding rate conditional on being previously employed in the private is 1.4 percent, roughly
equal to the rates conditional of previously being unemployed or inactive. For the private sector, again we
see the attachment of workers with a conditional job-finding rate of more than 40 percent. Being previously
employed in the public sector does not raise the job-finding rate in the private sector relative to the ones
that were unemployed or inactive (with job-finding rates of around 16 percent).
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of employment is in the public sector. In the US, the public sector accounts for all of the
employment in the industries of “Public administration” and “Armed forces” but only 35
percent of employment in “Educational and health services”.
3.2 Disaggregated worker flows
The tables in Appendix III show the average stock and flows of different subgroups of work-
ers, disaggregated by gender, education and age. Public-sector employment is particularly
relevant for women. On average, 16.5 and 22.2 percent of all women are working in the
public sector in France and in the UK, respectively. However, given than women’s labour
market participation is lower than men’s, public-sector employment corresponds to 27 and
33 percent of total employment for women in the two countries, roughly double than for
men. For Spain and the US, the gender differences are smaller. The Spanish and US public
sectors hire 19 percent of all working women, and only 12 percent of all working men. In
the four countries, the probability of a woman finding a job in the public sector is twice as
high as for men.
The public sector hires predominantly workers with tertiary education. The French public
sectors employs 23 percent of the population with tertiary education, 13 percent of people
with secondary education and only ten percent of people with only primary education. In
the UK, these numbers are 30, 15 and seven percent. In Spain, these are 19.1, 5.1 and 0.9
percent, similar to the 18.7, eight and 2.2 percent in the US. Public-sector employment of
college graduates represents more than a fifth of their employment in France, Spain and the
US and an extraordinary 36 percent in the UK.
Job-finding rates are increasing and job-separation rates are decreasing in education in
both sectors. In France, the fraction of the job-finding rate accounted for by the public sector
increases from ten percent for primary-educated workers to 13 percent for college graduates.
In the other countries, the differences are larger. This fraction increases from seven to 22
percent in the UK, from eight to 17 percent in Spain and from two to 16 percent in the US.
In the US, the public sector does not play any role in the labour market for primary-educated
workers, but it accounts for one fifth of all new hires of college graduates.
The public sector hires few young workers. Out of all employed workers aged 16 to 29,
the public sector accounts for only 16 percent in France and the UK, about eight percent
in Spain and 10 percent the US. In France and the UK, most public-sector employment
is concentrated on prime-age workers. The French and UK’s public sectors employ 17.6
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and 20.9 percent, respectively, of all workers aged 39-49. However, as a fraction of total
employment, the public sector is more significant for older workers (age 50-64), accounting
for 24 and 27 percent of their employment. This means that, in the private sector, older
workers leave the labour force at a faster pace. This age profile is even stronger in Spain and
the US, where the public sector employs around 15 percent of prime-age employed workers
and 22 percent of older employed workers.
3.3 Evolution of labour market stocks and flows
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the public and private employment rates and the unem-
ployment rate, while Figure 3 shows the transition probabilities between unemployment and
employment in both sectors. All the gross worker series were previously seasonally adjusted.
The graphs with the remaining transition probabilities are shown in Appendix I.
Our sample covers the period of the Great Recession. In France, from 2003 until 2008, the
unemployment rate fell to seven percent. After that, it increased regularly until it peaked at
the end of 2015. In the UK, prior to the Great Recession, the unemployment rate was stable
at five percent. In 2008, it increased sharply, hit its peak in 2012 at 8.5 percent and has
fallen since. In Spain, the unemployment rate increased from less than ten percent before
2008 to 25 percent in 2013. In the US, the unemployment rate increased sharply between
2008 and 2010, but then began to decline, reaching pre-crisis levels by the end of the sample.
One can observe that the size of the public sector diminished in all countries in the last
years of the sample, apart from Spain. In France, starting in 2008, it decreased by 300,000
workers - 1 percentage point of the working-age population. This means that the government
did not carry a countercyclical policy. On the contrary, in the UK, the government initially
increased the number of public-sector workers between 2008 and 2010, by 1 percentage point
of the working-age population. The fact that there was no increase in job-finding rate nor
a visible decrease in job-separation rate is because the change was in large the consequence
of a sharp fall in the direct flows to private employment. The reduction of public-sector
employment started only after 2010, with a decline equivalent to two percentage points of
the working-age population - equivalent to half a million workers. This sharp reduction
in public-sector employment since 2010 was achieved mainly with increases in outflows.
Compared to the first half of the sample, there were five thousand more workers that moved
to unemployment and 7.5 thousand more that move to inactivity from public employment
in each quarter.
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Figure 2: Labor market stock
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Note: private- and public-sector employment are expressed in percentage of the working-age population. The
unemployment rate is in percentage of the labour force.
In Spain, from its peak in 2011, public employment fell by 400,000 workers in less than
three years (1 percent of the working-age population), recovering almost entirely by the end
of the sample period. The job-separation rate to unemployment increased from 1.5 percent
in the beginning of the sample and reached 3.5 percent in 2011. Also, the job-finding rate
in the public sector fell from 3.5 percent at the beginning of the sample to 1.5 percent at
the end. In the US, public-sector employment declined as a fraction of the working-age
population between 2008 and 2018
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Figure 3: Transition rates between employment and unemployment.
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3.4 Cyclicality of worker flows
To have a more precise measure of the cyclicality of the hazard rate, we run an ordinary least
squares regression of the log of each transition rate on a linear trend and the unemployment
rate. This follows Baker (1992), who undertakes a similar procedure to analyse the cyclical
movements of unemployment duration. The results are shown in Table 1.7 The table also
shows the cyclicality of several measures of the public-sector employment stock. We consider
the largest sample available for the four countries.
The regression of different measures of stocks of public-sector employment confirms the
differences in cyclicality across the four countries, over the last recession. When we measure
public-sector employment in levels (logs) or as a fraction of the working-age population,
7Appendix I contains similar table with the results with the gross flows as a fraction of the working-age
population.
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Table 1: Cyclical variation of public-sector employment stock and hazard rates
France UK Spain US
Stock of public-sector employment
logG -0.015∗∗ (-4.22) -0.005 (−1.27) 0.000 (0.00) 0.008∗∗ (7.17)
G
W -0.195
∗∗ (-4.86) -0.006 (-1.30) -0.007 (−1.19) 0.021∗ (2.26)
G
P+G -0.115
∗ (-2.02) 0.167∗ (2.13) 0.148∗∗ (12.72) 0.238∗∗ (20.42)
G
P -0.185
∗ (-2.03) 0.287∗ (2.15) 0.210∗∗ (12.62) 0.338∗∗ (20.41)
Hazard rates
P → U 0.046∗∗ (2.99) 0.077∗∗ (10.09) 0.038∗∗ (10.33) 0.072∗∗ (23.65)
G→ U 0.082∗ (2.30) 0.120∗∗ (8.82) 0.033∗∗ (10.02) 0.066∗∗ (9.88)
P → I 0.016 (1.46) -0.020∗∗ (-4.32) -0.016∗ (−12.72) -0.026∗∗ (−12.06)
G→ I 0.032 (1.45) 0.004 (0.54) -0.003 (1.12) -0.018∗∗ (−4.57)
U → P -0.067∗∗ (-6.21) -0.072∗∗ (-17.14) -0.045∗∗ (−31.03) -0.108∗∗ (−48.07)
U → G -0.041 (-1.44) -0.142∗∗ (-11.02) -0.049∗∗ (−15.87) -0.109∗∗ (−16.14)
I → P -0.036∗∗ (-3.11) -0.043∗∗ (-6.48) -0.036∗∗ (−20.82) -0.051∗∗ (−23.94)
I → G -0.056∗ (-2.16) -0.056∗∗ (-5.76) -0.010∗∗ (−2.45) -0.030∗∗ (−6.51)
U → I 0.011 (0.58) -0.063∗ (-15.99) -0.035∗∗ (−22.53) -0.044∗∗ (21.50)
I → U 0.115∗∗ (6.34) 0.080∗∗ (22.22) 0.029∗∗ (16.93) 0.096∗∗ (47.41)
P → G -0.150∗∗ (-3.05) -0.109∗∗ (-9.76) -0.064∗∗ (−8.40) -0.007 (−1.34)
G→ P -0.171∗∗ (-2.88) -0.052∗∗ (-3.37) -0.040∗∗ (−7.06) 0.010 (−1.64)
Note: the cyclicality of the hazard rates is the coefficient on unemployment rate in a regression of
the series in logs on a time trend and the unemployment rate. The cyclicality of the stock is the
coefficient on unemployment rate in a regression of the indicated measure on a time trend and the
unemployment rate. T-statistics are in brackets.** denotes significant at 1% and * significant at 5%.
The sample is: France (between 2003:1 and 2017:4, 59 observations), UK (between 1994:4 and 2018:4,
97 observations), Spain (between 2005:1 and 2018:4, 56 observations), US (between 1996:1 and 2018:12,
276 observations).
it is procyclical in France, countercyclical in the US and acyclical in Spain and the UK.
Naturally, when we measure it as a fraction of total employment or private employment, as
the denominator is very procylical, it makes the ratio more countercyclical.
The hazard rates into and out of public-sector employment are very cyclical, with signs
similar to those of its private sector counterparts. The separation rates from employment
in both the public and private sectors to unemployment are strongly countercyclical, while
the job-finding rates are strongly procyclical. There is, however, a substantial asymmetry
between the coefficients. For example, the separation rate to unemployment from the public
sector is more cyclical than from the private sector in France and UK, but not in Spain or
the US. The hazard rates between the two sectors are also strongly procyclical, except in the
US. In expansions, there are more direct transitions between the two sectors. These might
justify some of the asymmetry between the cyclicality of public-sector employment across
countries. The other explanation might be the cyclicality of flows between employment
and inactivity. In the US, the hazard rate goes down in recessions, but not in France. In
the UK and Spain the procyclicality of separation rate to inactivity is only present in the
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private sector. In all countries, inflows into employment from inactivity (public or private)
are moderately procyclical. We now analyse in more detail the importance of inflows and
outflows into public-sector employment for unemployment fluctuations.
4 The role of the public sector in driving unemploy-
ment
4.1 Why does the public sector matter?
To understand the effects of ignoring the public sector when decomposing unemployment
fluctuations, consider the following example of an economy with a public sector that has
extremely low turnover. By this, we mean a separation rate λGU very close to zero, as well
as the hiring rate λUG. There are also no movements between public and private sector.
This scenario translates into a public sector with fixed size G¯, unresponsive to the economic
cycle. If one were to do a standard two-state decomposition, between total employment (E)
and (U), the measured job-finding and job-separation rates would be:
λUE = λUP ,
λEU =
NPU
P + G¯
=
λPU
1 + G¯
P
,
where NPU is the total number private sector workers that lost their jobs. We get the
second equality by dividing both the numerator and denominator by P . Notice that the
presence of the public sector would not affect the job-finding rate, but it would reduce the
job-separation rate by a factor of (1 + G¯
P
). This can be seen clearly in Figure 3 - the overall
job-finding rate is the sum of the job-finding rates in the two sectors, but the job-separation
rate is a weighted average of the sectoral job-separation rates. The main problem for the
unemployment decomposition is that, in a scenario with fixed public-sector employment,
the ratio G¯
P
will have a cyclical pattern. Consider a recession driven simultaneously by a
decrease in job-finding and an increase in job-separation from the private sector. As G¯
P
goes
up, λPU would go up by less than the separation rate in the private sector, so one would
underestimate the true contribution of separations.
The role of the public sector is more complex than this example shows because, in reality,
its employment has a cyclical pattern. As we have seen, it can be procyclical as in France,
countercyclical as in the US, or acyclical, as in Spain and the UK. Furthermore, whether
this cyclicality happens because the government increases or decreases hirings in recessions,
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or because there are fewer or more separations, could either reinforce or mitigate this bias
in the unemployment decomposition.
4.2 Unemployment decompositions
The starting point for all unemployment decompositions is the equation of the steady-state
unemployment usst . With four states, the equilibrium unemployment is a function of all 12
transition probabilities. See Appendix II for the exact formula and the comparison between
equilibrium and actual unemployment in the four countries. We perform two decomposi-
tion methods, one based on Shimer (2012) and the other on Fujita and Ramey (2009). In
this section, all the transition probabilities were previously corrected for time-aggregation
bias using the methodology applied by Shimer (2012). Other exercises, such as alternative
variables, no detrending, 3-states decomposition, and a non-steady-state decomposition, are
shown in Appendix II.
Table 2 displays the importance of each transition probability for the four countries and
the two methodologies. The bottom part of the table provides the relative split of the
contribution of different rates to fluctuations in the unemployment rate. Out of the total
contribution of flows in and out of employment, 20 percent are attributed to the public sector
in the UK, 15 percent in France, while only ten percent in Spain and the US. Out of these,
the inflows to public employment are more important than the outflows, with a relative split
of around 70-30.
Consistent with the literature, private sector job-finding rate is more important than its
job-separation rate, with a rough 60-40 split. In Appendix II, we show the usual three-state
decomposition. Given the cyclicality of the stocks and transition probabilities in this sample,
accounting for the public sector barely changes the relative importance of job-finding and
job-separation rates in France, but it matters marginally for the UK, Spain and the US,
where the ratio of public to private employment is more strongly countercyclical.
As in Elsby et al. (2011) or Hertweck and Sigrist (2015), we perform the unemployment
decomposition for different sub-groups of the population, based on gender, age and education.
We show the complete tables in Appendix III. In general, the contribution of the public sector
to fluctuations in unemployment is proportional to its size. In France and the UK, the
transition rate in and out of public-sector employment contributes to around 25 percent of
women’s unemployment, compared to less than ten percent of the male unemployment rate.
In the European countries, the public sector accounts for a larger fraction of fluctuations in
the unemployment rate of prime-age workers, with 29, 20 and 11 percent for France, UK and
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Table 2: 4-states unemployment decompositions
Shimer decomposition Fujita & Ramey decomposition
France UK Spain US France UK Spain US
P → U 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.22
G→ U 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
P → I -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
G→ I 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00
U → P 0.39 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.40 0.30 0.47 0.39
U → G 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.04
I → P 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.06
I → G 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02
I → U 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.12
U → I 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.13
P → G 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00
G→ P -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
Relative contributions (sum to 100)
Private employment vs. Public employment
86-14 79-21 88-12 91-9 85-15 80-20 88-12 90-10
Public job-finding rate vs. Public job-separation rate
63-37 67-33 75-25 64-36 60-40 67-33 76-24 69-31
Private job-finding rate vs. Private job-separation rate
62-38 57-43 67-33 63-37 62-38 58-42 69-31 64-36
Job-finding rate vs. Job-separation rate [3-states]
62-38 61-39 67-33 66-34 61-39 62-38 70-30 66-34
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time-aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000. Number in
the top half panel of the table reports the variance contributions of transition rates to changes in steady-
state unemployment. For instance, the first number of column 2 reads as follows: private job separation
rate accounts for 24% of the variations in French steady-state unemployment.
Spain. Finally, the public sector accounts for more than 20 to 30 percent of the fluctuation
in the unemployment rate of college graduates in the three European countries.
4.3 Unemployment during the Great Recession: a counterfactual
While the previous sub-section is based on an analysis of the transition rates, we now perform
an alternative analysis based on the level of worker gross flows. From the first quarter of
2008, we calculate what the unemployment rate would have been if the number of people
hired and separated from the public sector had been equal to the average of the sample until
2007. We assume that the number of people that transited between the other three states
(private-sector employment, unemployment and inactivity) are equal to the actual ones.
Figure 4 shows the actual and counterfactual unemployment rates. In France, from
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Figure 4: Counterfactual unemployment rate
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2010 onwards, the unemployment rate would have 1.1 percentage points lower if the hirings
and separations in the public sector had been kept constant. In the UK, since 2012, the
unemployment rate would have fallen faster if the government had not reduced public-sector
employment. The difference is 0.9 percentage points. Spain and the US have the opposite
pattern. By the end of the sample, the unemployment rate would have been higher without a
change in policy, by 1.3 percentage points in Spain and 0.8 in the US. While the government
employment component of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contributed
to reduce unemployment, the government employment component of the austerity policies
followed by France and UK generated higher unemployment.
5 How safe are public-sector jobs?
The argument that public-sector jobs are safer is often used in policy discussions over public-
sector wages. According to Gomes (2015a), the optimal design of the public-sector wage
schedule should take job security into account. Safer jobs raise a job’s expected duration
of a job and reduce the expected time spent in unemployment. Thus, the government
should offer lower wages in order to keep the value of a public-sector job in line with that
of the private-sector job. Hence, the estimation of the differences in job-loss probabilities
between the two sectors is extremely relevant from a policy perspective, but to the best of
our knowledge, there are no available estimates of value of the job safety that government
provides.
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5.1 Conditional job-separation rates
The evidence on the average gross flows provided in Section 3 suggests that jobs in the public
sector are indeed safer than those in the private sector.8 However, we also documented a
significant amount of heterogeneity along gender, education and age, so the lower aggregate
job-separation rates might be due, in part, to composition effects. In this section, using
a multinomial logit model, we estimate the probabilities of transiting out of employment
conditional on observable characteristics. Conditional on being employed, a worker can keep
his job, become unemployed or become inactive. We consider, staying employed as the base
outcome and compute the probabilities of becoming unemployed or inactive as:
λUi =
exp(xiβU)
1 + exp(xiβU) + exp(xiβI)
, (5)
λIi =
exp(xiβI)
1 + exp(xiβU) + exp(xiβI)
, (6)
where xi includes, as control variables, dummies for education, region, gender, occupation
and age. It also includes year dummies and year dummies interacted with being previously
employed in the public sector. Using the estimates, we are able to compute the evolution
of the predicted transition probabilities in both sectors over time, for an employee with the
average characteristics in the economy. Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of moving
to unemployment.
There are still large differences in the probability of moving to unemployment in the
two sectors, even controlling for observable characteristics. However, they are smaller than
the difference in unconditional separation rates, suggesting that a significant part is due to
composition effects. These differences are particularly large in France and the UK, where
the job-separation rates are twice as high in the private sector. The differences are smaller
in the United States, where the probability of moving to unemployment is 36 percent higher
in the private sector, and even smaller in Spain, where it is only 15 percent higher. In all
countries, job-separation rates in the private sector increased in the first years of the crisis.
However, they also increased in the public sector, but in later years, thus reducing the gap
8We associate the lower job-separation rate to safer jobs. The difference between the job-separation rates
in the two sectors might not only reflect on differences in job-riskiness, but could also encompass differences
in quit rates. For instance, if public-sector wages are higher relative to the private sector, quit rates might
be lower. The UK Labour Force has a question differentiating between involuntary separations, quits and
other voluntary separations. We have computed the shares of job-separation flows into these groups for
private and public employment. The fraction of involuntary job-separations out of the total is similar across
public and private sector, around the 50 percent found in Gomes (2012), meaning that both involuntary and
voluntary separations are lower in the public sector by the same proportion.
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Figure 5: Transition probability from employment to unemployment, by sector
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Note: Based on estimation of equations 5 and 6 using a multinomial logit. For France, there were 1,884,703
observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.090. For the UK, there were 1,678,331 observations and a pseudo
R-squared of 0.130. For Spain, there were 2,522,803 observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.094. For the
US, there were 7,571,635 observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.070. For France, the UK and Spain, the
transition rate was quarterly, while in the US, it was monthly. We used as controls regional, gender, age,
education and occupation dummy variables. The predicted probability is calculated based on an individual
with the average characteristics of the employed population. The sample covers 2003-2018 for UK and US,
2005-2018 for Spain and 2003-2017 for France. The dashes lines report the 95 percent confidence interval
on the prediction.
with the private sector by the end of the sample. In Appendix IV, we show the predicted
probabilities of moving to inactivity, but for the transition to inactivity difference between
the two sectors is small in all countries – between 10 to 16 percent higher – and, in general,
the confidence intervals overlap.
5.2 The value of safety in the public sector: a back-of-the-envelope
calculation
What do these differences represent? We use a metric to perform a back-of-the-envelope
calculation, based on the Bellman equation of employment and unemployment, stipulated
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by search models in continuous time:
rV e =
w1−σ
1− σ − δ(V
e − V u), (7)
rV u =
(z × w)1−σ
1− σ + f(V
e − V u), (8)
where the V e and V u are the value of employment or unemployment, w the wage rate, z the
flow value of unemployment expressed as a replacement rate of the wage, f the job-finding
rate, δ the job separation rate, σ the degree of risk aversion and r the discount rate. Using
these two equations, we can calculate the value of a lower job-separation rate. The exercise
is to calculate what fraction of their wage private-sector workers would be willing to give up
to have the same job-separation rate as public-sector workers.
We consider two cases. In the first case, workers are risk-neutral (σ = 0), meaning that
the value from job security comes only from spending a smaller fraction of time unemployed.
This provides a lower bound on the value of job security. In the second case, we consider
risk-averse workers (σ = 2) with no method of savings, which we interpret as an upper
bound.
Using the two equations, we calculate V e − V u and substitute back in equation 7 in
order to get the value of employment as a function of wage, separation rate, job-finding rate,
unemployment replacement rate, risk aversion and interest rate. For two different separation
rates, δ1 and δ2, the ratio of wages that equate the value of employment is given by:
w2
w1
=
[
(r + δ2 + f)
(r + δ1 + f)
(r + δ1 × z1−σ + f)
(r + δ2 × z1−σ + f)
] 1
1−σ
, (9)
which, under risk neutrality, collapses to:
w2
w1
=
(r + δ2 + f)
(r + δ1 + f)
(r + δ1 × z + f)
(r + δ2 × z + f) . (10)
The ratio of the two wages depends on the value of unemployment – in particular, how bad
it is relative to employment replacement rate) and how persistent it is (job-finding rate).
Notice that when the replacement rate is 1, the four terms cancel out, meaning that workers
would not be willing to sacrifice any wage for a lower job-separation rate. Naturally, if
the flow value on unemployment is exactly the same as the value of working, differences in
job-separation rates do not matter.
For the back-of-the-envelope calculation, we have five scenarios for the value of unem-
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Table 3: Back-of-the-envelope calculation on public-sector job-security premium
Scenario for value of unemployment Government budget
Very low Low Medium High Very high (medium scenario)
z = 0.3 z = 0.3 z = 0.5 z = 0.7 z = 0.7 Millions % of GDP % of Gov
f = min f = mean f = mean f = mean f = max Spending
Lower bound: risk neutrality (σ = 0)
France 2.5% 2.2% 1.6% 0.9% 0.8% 4422 (e) 0.20 0.39
UK 1.5% 1.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 1430 (£) 0.08 0.19
Spain 1.3% 0.9% 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 716 (e) 0.07 0.16
US 1.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 9963 ($) 0.05 0.16
Upper bound: risk aversion (σ = 2) and no insurance
France 6.9% 6.3% 2.9% 1.3% 1.1% 8241 (e) 0.38 0.72
UK 4.5% 3.5% 1.6% 0.7% 0.6% 2741 (£) 0.15 0.37
Spain 2.8% 2.1% 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 1241 (e) 0.11 0.28
US 3.7% 2.2% 1.0% 0.3% 0.2% 18854 ($) 0.10 0.30
Note: The first five columns of table report the fraction of the wage that a private-sector worker is willing to
forgo to have the same conditional job-separation rate as a public-sector worker in each country, depending
on the replacement rate and job-finding rate. The discount rate r is set to 0.005 for France, the UK and
Spain and to 0.0017 for the US. We calculate the budgetary value of job-security based on 2015 data on
wage compensation of government workers, GDP and total government spending provided by AMECO and
FRED datasets.
ployment, created with different values for the replacement rate (z = 0.3, z = 0.5 and
z = 0.7) and for the job-finding rate (the mean, minimum and maximum of the sample for
each country). The results are in the Table 3, using the average conditional rates in Figure
5.
The lower bound of the value of job security varies between 0.1 and 2.5 percent of the
wage for this range of realistic scenarios across the four countries, and the upper bound
varies between 0.2 and 6.9 percent of the wage. For the medium scenario for the value
of unemployment, workers would value this job security between 1.6 and 2.9 percent for
France, 0.8 to 1.6 percent for the UK and 0.5 to 1.0 percent for Spain and the US. We redo
the exercise using the unconditional job-separation rates in Figure 1, as well for the different
education levels, and show them in Appendix IV.9
To have an alternative metric, we get national accounts data from AMECO and FRED
datasets on “Compensation of employees: general government” for 2015. The compensation
to government employees represents, respectively, 12.8, 9.1, 11,1 and 10.3 percent of GDP
9Using the unconditional rates, the job-security premium is roughly double from the baseline numbers.
In France, the UK and the US, workers with less education are willing to pay more for the job safety of
the public sector. On the other hand, the Spanish public sector has a lower separation rate for only college
graduates.
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in France, the UK, Spain and the US. The numbers from national accounts will bias the
size of the public-sector wage bill downward, because they only account for a subset of the
total number of public-sector workers. Using the medium value of unemployment scenario
and risk neutrality, the value of a lower job-separation rate is equivalent to between 0.05 to
0.2 percent of GDP, or, alternatively, 0.16 to 0.4 percent of total government spending. The
upper bound is roughly double: between 0.10 to 0.37 percent of GDP or 0.3 to 0.72 percent
of total government spending.
This exercise provides only an interval for the value of job-security in the public sector,
as we are considering two extreme scenarios. In the lower bound, with risk-neutral workers,
the value arises from differences in expected duration of the match. In the upper bound, we
do not allow any self-insurance mechanism. A more precise answer would require considering
several insurances mechanisms, but that would require a more complicated framework. We
leave such calculations for future work.
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to establish a number of key facts about public- and private-
sector labour market flows. It provides a picture of a wide range of information about worker
gross flows from different angles, improving our understanding of the workings of these two
labour markets. The main findings of this paper can be summarised as follows:
 In France and the UK, the public sector represents 21 and 23 percent of total em-
ployment, respectively. Spain and the US have smaller public sectors, representing 16
percent of total employment.
 There is 30 to 50 percent less turnover in the public sector relative to the private sector.
 In each quarter (month in the US), the probability of a worker losing his job is 2-3
times higher in the private sector. Part of the difference is due to composition effects.
 In each quarter (month in the US), an unemployed worker has a 20 percent probability
of finding a job in the private sector and only a two to three percent chance of finding
a public-sector job.
 There are few direct transitions between the public and private sectors: 60 to 85 percent
of the new hires in the public sector come from non-employment.
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 The French and UK public sectors accounts for around 30 percent of total employment
of women. The Spanish and US public sectors account for 20 percent. In all countries,
the probability of women finding a job in the public sector is twice as high as for men.
 Public sectors hire predominantly college graduates, accounting for between 20 and 40
percent of their employment. The public sector is not relevant for workers with only a
primary education.
 The public sector represents a larger fraction of employment of older workers, account-
ing for 25 percent of their employment in France and the UK and 22 in Spain and the
US. The public sector hires few young workers.
 Public-sector employment has been countercyclical in the US, procyclical in France
and acyclical in Spain and the UK.
 Public-sector employment explains 20 percent of the fluctuations in the unemployment
rate in the UK, 15 percent in France and ten percent in Spain and the US.
 Public-sector employment explains a larger fraction of the fluctuations in unemploy-
ment rate of women, college graduates and older workers.
 Public-sector employment policies contributed to higher unemployment rate in France
and UK between 2010 and 2015, by 1.1 and 0.9 respectively. On the other hand, they
contributed to lower unemployment rate in Spain and US by 1.3 and 0.8 percentage
points.
 Private-sector workers would be willing to forgo 0.5 to 2.9 percent of their wage to
have the same job security as in the public sector.
This paper is starting point of a larger research agenda to study the effects of public-
sector employment using structural models, focussing on the heterogeneity across education
(Chassamboulli and Gomes, 2018), gender (Gomes and Kuehn, 2018) and age (Gomes and
Wellschmied, 2018).
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Figure A1: Individual transition rates, France
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Source: French Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A1 (cont): Individual transition rates, France
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Source: French Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A2: Individual transition rates, UK
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Source: UK Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A2 (cont): Individual transition rates, UK
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Source: UK Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A3: Individual transition rates, Spain
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Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A3 (cont): Individual transition rates, Spain
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Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey.
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Figure A4: Individual transition rates, US
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Figure A4 (cont): Individual transition rates, US
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Table A1: Most representative public sector industries, thousands
France UK
Industry Private sector Public sector Private sector Public sector
E Water supply, sewerage, waste 155 34 (18%) 166 42 (20%)
O Public administration and defence 275 2220 (89%) 282 1585 (85%)
P Education 423 1471 (78%) 739 2363 (76%)
Q Health and social work 2291 1299 (36%) 1691 2035 (55%)
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 308 74 (19%) 571 142 (20%)
U Extraterritorial organisations 12 8 (67%) 20 23 (52%)
Note: For the UK, it is the average number of workers between 2009 and 2016. For France, it is the
average number of workers between 2008 and 2015. The fraction of public-sector employment is in brack-
ets. For both the UK and France, all the remaining industries have less than 10 percent of public-sector
employment industries (A Agriculture, forestry and fishing; B Mining and quarrying; C Manufacturing;
D Electricity, gas, air cond supply; F Construction, G Wholesale, retail, repair of vehicle; H Transport
and storage; I Accommodation and food services; J Information and communication; K Financial and
insurance activities; L Real estate activities; M Prof, scientific, technical activ.; N Admin and support
services; S Other service activities; T Households as employers).
Table A2: Cyclical variation of labour market flows gross rates
France UK Spain US
Rates
P → U 0.039∗ (2.53) 0.063∗∗ (9.06) 0.026∗∗ (6.60) 0.057∗ (18.50)
G→ U 0.068 (1.92) 0.120∗∗ (8.58) 0.032∗∗ (8.02) 0.068∗∗ (10.19)
P → I 0.009 (0.82) -0.034∗∗ (-7.65) -0.028∗∗ (−23.94) -0.041∗∗ (−19.56)
G→ I 0.018 (0.80) 0.004 (0.45) -0.004 (−1.32) -0.016∗∗ (−3.99)
U → P 0.050∗∗ (4.65) 0.081∗∗ (16.71) 0.018∗∗ (14.09) 0.045∗∗ (19.43)
U → G 0.076∗∗ (2.70) 0.011 (0.90) 0.013∗∗ (3.41) 0.044∗∗ (6.76)
I → P -0.042∗∗ (-3.60) -0.042∗∗ (-7.84) -0.039∗∗ (−18.94) -0.043∗∗ (−20.97)
I → G -0.062∗ (-2.38) -0.056∗∗ (-5.75) -0.012∗∗ (−3.24) -0.022∗∗ (−4.70)
U → I 0.128∗∗ (7.12) 0.091∗∗ (20.65) 0.028∗∗ (24.14) 0.109∗∗ (44.26)
I → U 0.109∗∗ (5.90) 0.080∗∗ (19.74) 0.026∗∗ (17.55) 0.104∗∗ (46.25)
P → G -0.157∗∗ (-3.20) -0.123∗∗ (-10.77) -0.076∗∗ (−9.96) -0.023∗∗ (−4.20)
G→ P -0.185∗∗ (-3.12) -0.052∗∗ (-3.54) -0.041∗∗ (−7.46) -0.009 (−1.29)
Note: the cyclicality of the series is the coefficient on unemployment rate in a regression of the flows
as percentage of the working-age population in logs on a time trend and the unemployment rate. T-
statistics are in brackets.** denotes significant at 1% and * significant at 5%. The sample is between
2003:1 and 2018:4.
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II - Extra material: Section 4
Equilibrium unemployment with four-states transitions
In steady-state, there are no changes in the stocks so we set equations (1)-(4) to zero.
Normalizing the working-age population to 1, we can substitute Iss = 1− P ss −Gss − U ss,
and write a system of the remaining states in matrix form
A×
 P ssGss
U ss
 = B
where
A =
 (λPG + λPU + λPI + λIP ) (λIP − λGP ) (λIP − λUP )(λIG − λPG) (λGP + λGU + λGI + λIG) (λIG − λUG)
(λIU − λPU) (λIU − λGU) (λUP + λUG + λUI + λIU)

and
B =
 λIPλIG
λIU

The solution of this system is then given by: P ssGss
U ss
 = A−1 ×B
To calculate the unemployment rate we need to compute U
ss
P ss+Gss+Uss
.
Figure A5: Unemployment rate (blue lines) and its steady state counterpart (dotted lines)
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Continuous time-aggregation bias correction
We can record the transitions rates λij in a 4× 4 discrete time Markov transition matrix
with columns summing to 1. Let µ denote a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues and p the matrix
with corresponding eigenvectors of the discrete transition matrix. Suppose now that the
transitions occur in a continuous time environment. Let λ˜ be the 4 × 4 continuous time
Markov transition matrix that records in the off-diagonal the Poisson continuous arrival
rate, λ˜ij from state i ∈ {P,G,U, I} to state j 6= i. We can retrieve the continuous time
transition matrix from the limit of the discrete transition matrix:
λ˜m = lim
∆→0
pµ∆p−1 − I
∆
(A1)
Table A3: Three-states unemployment decompositions
Shimer Fujita & Ramey
France UK Spain US France UK Spain US
E → U 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.22
E → I -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
U → E 0.46 0.44 0.54 0.43 0.48 0.42 0.55 0.43
I → E 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07
I → U 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.12
U → I 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.15
Relative contribution
Job-finding vs Job separation 62-38 61-39 67-33 66-34 61-39 62-38 70-30 6634
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
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Table A4: Shimer’s 4-states unemployment decompositions, no detrending
France UK Spain US
P → U 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.17
G→ U 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
P → I 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04
G→ I 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
U → P 0.34 0.30 0.50 0.35
U → G 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.03
I → P 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.07
I → G 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
I → U 0.30 0.08 0.04 0.14
U → I -0.04 0.09 0.12 0.09
P → G 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00
G→ P -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
Relative contributions (sum to 100)
Private employment vs. Public employment
81-19 80-20 86-14 91-9
Public job-finding rate vs. Public job-separation rate
64-36 67-33 78-22 68-32
Private job-finding rate vs. Private job-separation rate
63-37 57-43 73-37 68-32
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012).
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Table A5: 4-states unemployment decompositions, no adjustment by tenure for job-to-job
transitions
France UK Spain US
P → U 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22
G→ U 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02
P → I -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
G→ I 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
U → P 0.39 0.32 0.49 0.38
U → G 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03
I → P 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.07
I → G 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
I → U 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.13
U → I 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.13
P → G 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
G→ P -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Relative contributions (sum to 100)
Private employment vs. Public employment
86-14 80-20 90-10 91-9
Public job-finding rate vs. Public job-separation rate
63-37 63-37 77-23 63-33
Private job-finding rate vs. Private job-separation rate
62-38 57-43 67-33 63-37
Note: The gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
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Table A6: Elsby et al. (2015) non-steady state decomposition, 4-states
Elsby et al. (2015) non-steady state decomposition
France UK Spain US
P → U 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.16
G→ U 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01
P → I -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
G→ I 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00
U → P 0.36 0.32 0.51 0.45
U → G 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.03
I → P 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05
I → G 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
I → U 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.14
U → I 0.13 0.23 0.18 0.16
P → G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G→ P 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00
Relative contributions (sum to 100)
Private employment vs. Public employment
83-17 73-27 90-10 93-7
Public job-finding rate vs. Public job-separation rate
67-33 61-39 76-24 70-30
Private job-finding rate vs. Private job-separation rate
65-25 76-24 73-27 74-26
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time-aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). Series are “smoothed” with a 3-order moving average for France, UK and Spain, and a 9-order
moving average for the US.
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Figure A6: Counterfactual exercise, France
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Figure A7: Counterfactual exercise, UK
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Figure A8: Counterfactual exercise, Spain
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Figure A9: Counterfactual exercise, US
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Table A11: Unemployment decompositions of subgroups (2003-2017). France
Shimer
All Men Women 15-29 30-49 50-64 Primary. Secondary Tertiary
P → U 0.24 0.39 0.11 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.20 0.26
G→ U 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.05
P → I -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.03
G→ I 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
U → P 0.39 0.32 0.44 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.42 0.36 0.32
U → G 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.06
I → P 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
I → G 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06
I → U 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.09 0.16
U → I 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.03
P → G 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
G→ P -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
Table A12: Unemployment decompositions of subgroups (2003-2018). UK
Shimer
All Men Women 15-29 30-49 50-64 Primary. Secondary. Tertiary
P → U 0.24 0.33 0.09 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.28 0.11 0.17
G→ U 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.05
P → I -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01
G→ I 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05
U → P 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.51 0.53 0.34
U → G 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.20
I → P 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.04
I → G 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01
I → U 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.04
U → I 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.08
P → G 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
G→ P -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
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Table A13: Unemployment decompositions of subgroups (2005-2018). Spain
Shimer
All Men Women 15-29 30-49 50-64 Primary. Secondary. Tertiary
P → U 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.18
G→ U 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
P → I -0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03
G→ I 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
U → P 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.50 0.43
U → G 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.13
I → P 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.05
I → G 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.02
I → U 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.03
U → I 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.11
P → G 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
G→ P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
Table A14: Unemployment decompositions of subgroups (2003-2018). US
Shimer
All Men Women 15-29 30-49 50-64 Primary. Secondary. Tertiary
P → U 0.22 0.26 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.24
g → U 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02
P → I -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00
G→ I 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
U → P 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.31 0.56 0.42 0.33
U → G 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.07
I → P 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03
I → G 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
I → U 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.12
U → I 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.13
P → G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G→ P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: the gross flows series are previously seasonally adjusted using the X13 Census programme and the
transition probabilities are corrected for time aggregation bias using the methodology applied by Shimer
(2012). The series are then detrended with an HP filter with smoothing parameter of 100000.
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IV - Extra material: Section 5
Figure A10: Transition probability from employment to inactivity, by sector
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Note: Based on estimation of equations 5 and 6 using a multinomial logit. For France, there were 1,884,703
observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.090. For the UK, there were 1,678,331 observations and a pseudo
R-squared of 0.130. For Spain, there were 2,522,803 observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.094. For the
US, there were 7,571,635 observations and a pseudo R-squared of 0.070. For France, the UK and Spain, the
transition rate was quarterly, while in the US, it was monthly. We used as controls regional, gender, age,
education and occupation dummy variables. The predicted probability is calculated based on an individual
with the average characteristics of the employed population. The sample covers 2003-2018 for the UK and
US, 2005-2018 for Spain and 2003-2017 for France. The dashes lines report the 95 percent confidence
interval on the prediction.
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Table A15: Public-sector job-security premium, unconditional job-separation rates
Scenario for value of unemployment Government budget
Very low Low Medium High Very high (medium scenario)
z = 0.3 z = 0.3 z = 0.5 z = 0.7 z = 0.7 Millions % of GDP % of Gov
f = min f = mean f = mean f = mean f = max Spending
Lower bound: risk neutrality (σ = 0)
France 4.0% 3.6% 2.5% 1.5% 1.3% 7161 (e) 0.33 0.63
UK 3.1% 2.4% 1.7% 1.0% 0.9% 2979 (£) 0.16 0.41
Spain 7.3% 5.1% 3.6% 2.1% 1.5% 4261 (e) 0.39 0.97
US 3.5% 1.9% 1.4% 0.5% 0.4% 25702 ($) 0.14 0.41
Upper bound: risk aversion (σ = 2) and no insurance
France 10.5% 9.7% 4.6% 2.1% 1.8% 12963 (e) 0.59 1.13
UK 8.8% 7.1% 3.2% 1.4% 1.2% 5599 (£) 0.30 0.76
Spain 14.6% 11.8% 5.9% 2.8% 2.0% 7080 (e) 0.66 1.62
US 9.2% 5.7% 2.6% 0.7% 0.4% 48166 ($) 0.27 0.77
Note: The first five columns of table reports the fraction of the wage that a private sector worker is willing
to forgo to have the same unconditional job-separation rate as a public sector worker in each country,
depending on the replacement rate and job-finding rate. The discount rate r is set to 0.005 for France, UK
and Spain and to 0.0017 in the US. We calculate the budgetary value of job-security based on 2015 data
on wage compensation of government workers, GDP and total government spending provided by AMECO
and FRED datasets.
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Table A16: Public-sector job-security premium, different education groups
Country Scenario for value of unemployment
Very low Low Medium High Very high
z = 0.3 z = 0.3 z = 0.5 z = 0.7 z = 0.7
f = min f = mean f = mean f = mean f = max
Primary educated workers
France 2.9%-7.2% 2.6%-6.6% 1.8%-3.2% 1.1%-1.5% 1.0%-1.3%
UK 3.4%-9.1% 1.9%-5.5% 1.3%-2.5% 0.8%-1.1% 0.6%-0.8%
Spain - - - - -
US 2.8%-5.8% 1.2%-3.3% 0.9%-1.6% 0.3%-0.4% 0.2%-0.3%
Secondary educated workers
France 2.4%-7.0% 2.1%-6.0% 1.5%-2.8% 0.9%-1.2% 0.7%-1.0%
UK 1.7%-4.8% 1.1%-3.2% 0.8%-1.4% 0.5%-0.6% 0.4%-0.5%
Spain - - - - -
US 2.2%-5.6% 1.3%-3.6% 0.9%-1.6% 0.4%-0.4% 0.2%-0.3%
Tertiary educated workers
France 2.1%-6.2% 1.8%-5.2% 1.2%-2.4% 0.7%-1.0% 0.6%-0.9%
UK 1.0%-3.1% 0.7%-2.2% 0.5%-1.0% 0.3%-0.4% 0.2%-0.3%
Spain 2.1%-5.2% 1.2%-3.4% 0.8%-1.6% 0.5%-0.7% 0.3%-0.5%
US 0.7%-2.0% 0.4%-1.2% 0.3%-0.5% 0.1%-0.1% 0.1%-0.1%
Note: The table reports the lower and upper bound of fraction of the wage that a private sector worker
is willing to forgo to have the same unconditional job-separation rate as a public sector worker in each
country, depending on the replacement rate and job-finding rate The discount rate r is set to 0.005 for
France, UK and Spain and to 0.0017 in the US.
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V - Extra material: Conditional transition rates
Table A17: Conditional job-finding rates, US (Average 1996-2018)
U-E rate I-E rate
Public Private Public Private
Unconditional 1.83 20.38 0.85 5.90
Conditional
G 29.48 16.85 26.35 11.19
P 1.39 40.48 1.53 31.91
U 1.48 17.14 1.12 10.63
I 1.53 15.79 0.38 2.89
Note: The table reports the unconditional transition rates from unemployment (inactivity) to employment
in a given sector, conditional on the state prior to unemployment (inactivity).
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